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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found David George Herod guilty of two counts of
felony lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.

On each count, the district court

imposed a concurrent unified sentence of twenty-five years, with seven years fixed.
Mr. Herod appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it allowed
one of the State’s expert witnesses, Alisa Ortega, to testify on how she determined
whether an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the credibility of the
complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued that Mr. Herod did not establish an
abuse of discretion because Ms. Ortega’s challenged testimony was admissible
evidence relevant to credibility and not an inadmissible opinion that a witness was
telling the truth, and that any error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.5-12.) This Reply Brief
is necessary to show the State’s argument ignores the distinction between expert
testimony that merely assists the jury and testimony like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon
the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Herod’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how
she determined whether an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the
credibility of the complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Ms. Ortega To Testify On How
She Determined Whether An Allegation Is False, Because Her Testimony Passed Upon
The Credibility Of The Complaining Witnesses And Thereby Usurped The
Jury’s Function
A.

Introduction
Mr. Herod asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed

Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined whether an allegation is false, because
Ms. Ortega’s testimony passed upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurped
the jury’s function. See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003).
B.

Ms. Ortega’s Testimony Passed Upon The Credibility Of The Complaining
Witnesses And Thereby Usurped The Jury’s Function
Mr. Herod asserts that Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether

an allegation was false passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and
thereby usurped the jury’s function. Ms. Ortega’s testimony indirectly vouched for the
truth of T.W.’s and A.M.’s accounts.

Her testimony was “useful to bolster [the

witnesses’] credibility but [did] not provide the trier of fact with any additional
information” that pertained to the case.

See Perry, 139 Idaho at 525.

Because

credibility questions are left to the jury, the testimony did not “help the trier of fact to find
facts or understand the evidence as required by I.R.E. 702.” See id. Put otherwise,
with her testimony, Ms. Ortega “usurp[ed] the role of the jury as the ultimate finder of
credibility.” See id.
The State recognizes that expert testimony is admissible up to the point where
an expression of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses. (Resp. Br., p.6.) The State argues that “while a witness may not opine on
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the truthfulness of another witness’ statement, an expert may impart knowledge that will
assist the jury to make its own evaluation.” (Resp. Br., p.7 (citing State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 599-600 (2013); State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 684-85 (Ct. App. 2012).)
The State then contends that Ms. Ortega’s testimony was admissible because she “did
not ‘venture beyond [the] point’ of ‘pass[ing] upon the credibility of witnesses or the
weight of disputed evidence,’” but instead “merely provided many factors she employed
when deciding whether to diagnose sexual abuse.” (See Resp. Br., p.7.)
The State’s argument ignores the distinction between expert testimony that
merely assists the jury and testimony, like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon the credibility
of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function. The Almarez and Critchfield cases
cited by the State (see Resp. Br., p.7), help illustrate the failings of the State’s
argument. While the State characterizes the holdings in Almarez and Critchfield as
“expert opinion helping jury determine reliability of eyewitness identification admissible”
(Resp. Br., p.7), the State’s gloss on those cases does not tell the full story.
In Almarez, the district court prohibited defense expert testimony on the
suggestiveness of an officer’s interview procedures used to obtain an eyewitness
identification in a first-degree murder case. Almarez, 154 Idaho at 588-89. The district
court allowed the defense expert, a cognitive psychologist, to testify about the
suggestiveness of the photographic lineup used by the officer, but ruled his expert
opinion on the suggestiveness of the interview would invade the province of the jury. Id.
at 599.

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held “the district court abused its

discretion when it ruled that [the defense expert] could not testify about the specific
procedures used in [the eyewitness’] interview.” Id. at 600. The Almarez Court noted
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“[t]he disallowed testimony offered by [the defense expert] was aimed at specific
procedures employed by [the officer], and how empirical research has shown those
procedures to be suggestive. [The defense expert] was not offering an opinion on the
credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony itself.” Id.
In Critchfield, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial in a
lewd conduct case on the basis that the district court should have allowed a defense
expert in law enforcement interview techniques to testify on proper interview techniques,
the purposes behind those techniques, and how improper techniques were used in the
victim interviews at issue. Critchfield, 153 Idaho at 682. The State appealed from the
district court’s order for a new trial, contending the defense expert’s testimony was
properly excluded at the initial trial.

Id.

The State argued the defense expert’s

testimony would be inadmissible as usurping the jury’s function or invading the province
of the jurors, but the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected that argument. Id. at 684-85. The
Critchfield Court held “the offer of proof regarding [the defense expert’s] proposed
testimony did not include any such prohibited opinion on the credibility of any victim
witness or on [the defendant’s] guilt.”

Id. at 684.

The proffered testimony was

admissible because the defense expert “would critique the officers’ interview methods,
not the alleged victims’ accuracy or honesty.” Id.
The full story behind the Almarez and Critchfield holdings helps show the State’s
argument ignores the distinction between expert testimony that merely assists the jury
and testimony that passes upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the
jury’s function.

The expert testimony in Almarez would have concerned “specific

instances of police suggestiveness, which would have been helpful to the average
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juror’s understanding of whether the interview was conducted in an overly suggestive
way.” Almarez, 154 Idaho at 600. To the contrary, Ms. Ortega testified here regarding
what details would lead her to conclude an allegation of child sexual abuse was
probably true (Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.11-24), and the complaining witnesses provided those
types of details at the trial. (See App. Br., p.11.)

Thus, unlike the defense expert in

Almarez, who did not offer an opinion on the credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness
testimony itself, Ms. Ortega’s testimony indirectly vouched for the truth of T.W.’s and
A.M.’s accounts.

Cf. Almarez, 154 Idaho at 600.

The Almarez Court emphasized

“[c]redibility is an issue for the jury, as the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.” Id.
Similar to Almarez, the offer of proof regarding the defense expert’s proposed
testimony in Critchfield did not include any prohibited opinion on the credibility of any
victim witness. See Critchfield, 153 Idaho at 684. In contrast, Ms. Ortega’s testimony
spoke to the alleged victims’ accuracy or honesty.

Cf. id.

As discussed in the

Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.11-13), such credibility determinations are not
beyond the common experience of the jury, and the jury’s function is to make credibility
determinations. Thus, unlike the testimony in Almarez and Critchfield, Ms. Ortega’s
testimony did not “help the trier of fact to find facts or understand the evidence as
required by I.R.E. 702.” See Perry, 139 Idaho at 525.
The State further argues that Mr. Herod’s assertion on appeal “was effectively
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Blackstead, [126 Idaho 14, 21-22]
(Ct. App. 1994).” (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the State has failed to mention the factual
differences between the testimony at issue in Blackstead and Ms. Ortega’s testimony.
Because of those factual differences, Blackstead is not controlling here.
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In Blackstead, the State called as an expert witness a licensed counselor, who
specialized in the treatment of victims of childhood sexual abuse. Blackstead, 126
Idaho at 20.

The State’s expert testified about behavioral characteristics of sexual

abuse victims, including delay in disclosing the abuse. Id. Before the State’s expert
testified, an alleged victim had already testified as to why she delayed in reporting the
defendant’s alleged sexual abuse. Id. at 20-21. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant’s “argument that [the State’s expert’s] testimony amounted to
nothing more than vouching for the victim’s credibility and was cumulative to the victim’s
own testimony,” because it “overlooks the distinction that merely opines as to the
victim’s credibility and testimony which corroborates elements of the victim’s story or
aids the jury in evaluating the victim’s truthfulness.” Id. at 22.
The State’s treatment of Blackstead stops there (see Resp. Br., p.8), but again
the State has not told the full story.

The State’s expert in Blackstead “had never

interviewed [the alleged victim] or reviewed her records, and she offered no testimony
directly addressing [the alleged victim’s] own experiences. Neither did she present an
opinion as to whether [the alleged victim’s] testimony was truthful, whether [the alleged
victim] had been abused or by whom.” Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 22. Conversely, in the
instant case Ms. Ortega conducted a physical examination of A.M. (Trial Tr., p.169,
Ls.19-25,) and watched A.M.’s forensic interview. (Trial Tr., p.158, Ls.15-17.) During
the physical examination, Ms. Ortega asked A.M. whether there had been any pain,
hurt, or bleeding. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Ortega also offered testimony on
A.M.’s experiences as A.M. related them during the forensic interview. (Trial Tr., p.158,
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L.22 – p.165, L.2, p.167, L.13 – p.168, L.21.) Further, Ms. Ortega presented an opinion
as to whether A.M. had been sexually abused. (Trial Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.2.)
Thus, there are key factual differences between the testimony at issue in
Blackstead and Ms. Ortega’s testimony. The Blackstead Court held the State’s expert’s
testimony was properly admitted because the expert “gave the juror’s specialized
knowledge that could help them evaluate the credibility of [the alleged victim’s]
explanation as to why she failed to more promptly disclose the alleged abuse. The
expert did not, however, comment on [the alleged victim’s] veracity . . . .” Blackstead,
126 Idaho at 22. In this case, rather than assist the jury with specialized knowledge,
Ms. Ortega’s testimony went towards the veracity of the complaining witnesses. Cf. id.
Because of the factual differences discussed above, Blackstead is not controlling here.
Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether an allegation was false
passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s
function. The State’s argument to the contrary ignores the distinction between expert
testimony that merely assists the jury and testimony like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon
the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function. The district court
abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined
whether an allegation is false.
C.

The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving The District Court’s Abuse Of
Discretion Was Harmless
Mr. Herod asserts the State has not met its burden of proving the district court’s

abuse of discretion in allowing Ms. Ortega’s challenged testimony was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). To the extent the
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State’s harmlessness argument relies upon its incomplete characterization of
Blackstead (see Resp. Br., pp.10-11), its argument should be rejected because
Blackstead is not controlling here.
The State’s harmlessness argument is otherwise unremarkable, and Mr. Herod
would thus direct this Court’s attention to Pages 14-15 of the Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Herod respectfully requests this Court reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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